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Lawyers have a stake in constitutional questions beyond that of other
citizens They are concerned professionally with the framework of
government They work within it and come in daily contact with it
More than a few people say that the organic law of the land is
obsolescent With major revisions in mind, they advocate the calling of
a constitutional convention under the authority of Article V of the
Constitution of the United States Others would be content with
specific amendments As to some of them, there is a consensus that the
proposals are sound and the amendments long overdue
The purpose of this article is to catalogue currently proposed amend-
ments for the convenience of the segment of society most competent to
pass upon them Principal contentions pro and con will be summarized
or indicated
As every lawyer knows, constitutional governments may be classified
according to three types:
(1) The British type comes first There are dicta to the effect that
" the common law will control acts of Parliament and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void" as "against common right and reason"
Actually in England law and custom must yield to Parliament I Never-
theless in practice all British Parliaments recognize the continuity of
common law concepts of basic rights 2 Clement Atlee has made this
clear in public statements since becoming Prime Minister So it is not
too inaccurate to say that in England there is an unwritten constitution
which Parliament does not ignore though it has the legal power to do so
(2) Then, second, there is the European type of written constitution
which spells out the structure of government but is not subject to inter-
pretation by an independent judiciary Such a constitution is obviously
subject to the fiats of dictators
'In his COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Blackstone says: "It
(Parliament) has sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, con-
firming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and ex-
pounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesi-
astical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the
place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments
reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms"
(Book I, § 222)2 For an ancient statement see ibid, Book I, § 39
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(3) The third type is that exemplified by the Constitution of the
United States, our state constitutions and those of the British dominions
These constitutions are given effect by the judicial power to declare
laws unconstitutional In his work on Constitutional Limitations,"
Cooley calls this type of constitution
"c the absolute rule of action and decision for all depart-
ments and officers of the government, in respect to all the
points covered by it, which must control until it shall be
changed by the authority which established it, and in opposi-
tion to which any act or regulation" is void
Using the words of Grote, a first purpose of a constitution is to put
"perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness
of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be no less sacred
in the eyes of his opponents than in his own "
Desiring to shield the citizen from the oppressions of government and
from the caprice of men in public office, the authors of the two consti-
tutions under which we live were more concerned with securing and
preserving liberty than with maximum efficiency in governmental
administration And so it is that when considering the desirability of
proposed changes to our constitutions, the possible effect upon liberty
as well as the possible effect upon administrative efficiency should be
ever in mind
In addition to the rights and freedoms reserved by the bill of rights,
the fundamentals of our present form of government include:
(a) A President elected for a fixed term by popular vote,
(b) A bi-cameral congress wherein the house is apportioned
according to population and regardless of population each state
is accorded two senators;
(c) Recognition of the principle of judicial supremacy under
which the courts have the right to judge the legality of the acts
and determinations of members of the executive and legislative
branches;
(d) A relationship with the forty-eight states which does
not grant full sovereignty to the federal government but, on
the contrary, by the tenth amendment expressly reserves to the
states or to the people powers not delegated to the United
States by the constitution and, finally;
(e) Substantially universal adult suffrage
Constitutional amendments not touching these would not affect the
essence of our federal structure For instance, a modification of the
residential requirements for United States senators would not change
the nature of our government
So much for reminders by way of background We now turn to
specific proposals for amendments to the Constitution of the United
States The legislative branch comes first
2 (Eighth edition) p 5
'See THonAs K FINLETTER, CAN REPRESENTATIVE GovERNziINT Do THE JOB?




Article I, Section 1 of the Federal Constitution states:
"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate
and House of Representatives"
The Congress is or has been at a low ebb Proposals for the strength-
ening of Congress are legion They encompass suggestions that:
(i) In the hope of attracting men of higher calibre, con-
gressional salaries should be doubled and retirement pay
provided
(ii) The present overlapping committee structure (48 com-
mittees in the House and 33 in the Senate, sometimes
called "little legislatures competing for jurisdiction")
should be abandoned and replaced~with a simplified and
efficient type of organization
(iii) The seniority rule in choosing the chairmen of standing
committees should be discarded and chairmen selected
on merit
(iv) The legislators and their committees should be given
sufficient and proficient technical assistants
(v) The house should be reduced greatly in size
But none of these necessitates an amendment to the Constitution The
Congress itself can put into effect those reforms which it deems desir-
able Important as they are, we by-pass all proposals of this sort because
they are not constitutional questions 5
RESIDENTIAL REQuI-kR ENTS
It has been proposed that residential requirements for congressmen
be abolished
Section 3 of Article I of the Federal Constitution provides no person
shall be a senator "who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that
state for which he shall be chosen ' Section 2 contains similar language
in respect to representatives
Similarly state restrictions often require that a candidate for state
legislative office reside in the district which he proposes to represent
It is of course within the power of a state to correct this But it is not
within the power of any state to authorize election of a man not a
resident of that state to the United States Senate Outstanding men
tannot choose to file in a state where election would be easy, or at least
probable
Commenting on the disadvantages of present requirements as to
residence, Bryce8 said that "since he (a defeated candidate) cannot find
a seat elsewhere he is stranded; his political life is dosed, while other
young men inclined to independence take warning from his fate" A
a See RoLAND YouNG, THis Is CoNGREss, Alfred A. Knopf; ROBERT HEZER,
STRNGTENING T1E CoNGREss, National Planning Association; Charles A
Eton, A Member of Congress Looks at Congress, THE NEw YoRK Tn s M&aG-
Azn (March 4, 1945)
"See I TnE Awm cAN ComnoNwEALTH 191-195
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more recent commentator7 remarks that residential requirements:
cc have made steadily for parochialism in legislation, for
the security and prosperity of petty local bosses and machines,
for the multiplication of pocket and rotten boroughs of the
worst sort, and, above all, for the progressive degeneration
of the honesty and honor of representatives"
Amendments to the Federal Constitution have been advocated which
would remove all requirements as to the residence of United States
senators-Republican Hoover could file in Maine and a Vermont demo-
crat in Alabama
Two SENATORS FROM EVERY STATE
Our specie of the Polish Veto is much criticized It will be recalled
that anciently in Poland one negative vote doomed a measure to
defeat 8 Because each of the 48 United States is entitled to two senators
regardless of population, senators representing a small minority of the
people can block legislation favored by an overwhelming majority A
senator from New York represents 125 times as many persons as does
a senator from Nevada Eight million three hundred thousand people in
the prairie and mountain states have 24 votes in the senate Twelve
million five hundred thousand residents of New York have 2 votes
Thirty-three senators representing the 17 smallest states containing less
than 8% of the population can block any treaty
But Article V of the Constitution provides that "no state, without its
consent, shall be deprived of equal suffrage in the senate " This language
seems too clear for construction
SENATE APPROVAL OF TREATIES
Under Article II, Section 2, the President has the power "by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-
thirds of the senators present concur" John Hay cynically remarked:
"A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull going into the
arena; no one can tell just when or how the blow will fall-but
one thing is certain-it will never leave the arena alive "0
Actually the record is not so bad Of some 1200 treaties negotiated,
800 to 900 were confirmed, between 100 and 200 died in Senate com-
mittee and about 100 were formally rejected
Then there is an escape mechanism in the form of presidential
executive agreements which have prior or subsequent congressional
authorization or ratifications The acquisition of Texas and Hawaii are
venerable instances The Hull trade agreements authorized by the
Trade Agreements Act of 1934 are recent examples
Even further from the constitutional mandate are executive agree-
ments without either prior or subsequent congressional approval The
" H L. Mencken in essay on Politics.
8 See 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 142




trade of the 50 over-age destroyers in September 1940 was a dramatic
instance Timothy Pickering-Washington's Postmaster General-in-
augurated this device with an agreement with Canada concerning the
mails Since then more than 300 international agreements concerning
the mails have been made by the executive department Only three-
1% of them-have been submitted to the Senate for ratification
The United States Supreme Court has never declared an executive
agreement unconstitutional and at least two decisions ° seem to recog-
nize that they are legal unless and until the Congress supersedes them
Their importance is indicated by these brief data:
During the first fifty years of the Republic (1789 to 1839) there
were 60 treaties and 27 executive agreements, 2 to 1 in favor of treaties
During the second 50 years (1840 to 1890) there were 215 treaties
and 238 executive agreements, the latter edging into the lead
During the third fifty years (1891 to 1940) there were 524 treaties
and 917 executive agreements
With a world organization before us the problem is real Should
treaties be subject to defeat by a few determined senators? To avoid
that risk, should we evade the Constitution, call treaties by another
name, and enter into some of them with and into some without con-
gressional review and approval?
A proposal with much backing is that Article II, Section 2, be
amended to read that the President-
It shall have power to make treaties provided a majority
of the members elect of both the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives concur therein"
Ratification by 49 senators without submission to the house is also
proposed Opponents of both say the present system works out well,
that the control of the Senate over treaty making should be undimin-
ished and that, in fact, the Senate should be consulted more than it has
been in respect to international engagements
Now comes the executive department
THn EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Article I1 of the Federal Constitution lodges the executive power in
the President, tells how he shall be elected and prescribes his powers
and duties Perhaps it is sound to assert that the most pressing of
today's constitutional problems are found in the relationship, in the
balance of power, if you please, between the legislative and executive
departments-particularly when included in the latter are the myriad
quasi-independent establishments, authorities, bureaus and boards now
operated by the federal government
THE ITEM VETO
The veto power of the President is a point where opinions differ
10 U S v Belmont, 301 U S 324, 81 L ed 1134 (1936), and U S v
Curtiss Wright, 299 U S 304, 81 L ed 255 (1936)
1946]
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Consistent believers in the parliamentary system of government would
take away his present veto power
Differing sharply is the proposal that the veto power should be
enlarged so that the President may veto parts of a bill while approving
the rest The Constitution gives the President the power to veto any act
of the Congress, no matter how important But it does not give him
the right to veto part of an act or, more specifically, particular items of
an appropriation bill It is all or nothing Even an avowed collectivist "1
presumably not opposed to lavish public spending, agrees that the
President should have the power of item veto Writers seem to concur
in the view that the federal pork barrel would be much smaller were it
not for this defect in the Constitution Many, if not most, appropriation
bills include indefensible items amounting to a bounty to some special
interest Many a president would delete them, or some of them, and
return them to the Congress with the spotlight of publicity upon them
if he possessed the legal power to do so
It is axiomatic that if an omnibus appropriation bill includes a little
something for a numerical prepondelance of the congressional districts,
the bill is sure to pass And if something be included for every district,
the vote will be almost unanimous! President Arthur was not unaware
of this technique "Thus," he said in a message to the Congress, "As
the bill becomes more objectionable it secures more support The
Constitution should be so amended as to give the President power to
veto separate items of appropriation bills"
Ofttimes congressmen who do not oppose an appropriation before a
veto will vote against that same appropriation after the veto Regretting
that appropriation bills should be "defaced by items and provisions to
meet private ends," Cleveland vetoed 343 bills Yet scarcely any bills
were passed over his veto, though passed with little or no opposition
before the veto The Constitution furnishes the key to this change of
vote It provides that after a vetoed bill with the President's objections
has been returned to the Congress:
" the votes of both houses shall be taken by yeas and nays,
and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill
shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively "112
Many eminent congressmen and several Presidents have advocated the
item veto During the past 70 years more than 45 resolutions have been
introduced in the House or Senate looking toward an appropriate
amendment to Section 7 of Article I of the Federal Constitution
Though Congress refrains from passing a resolution to submit an
amendment to the states, Congress does think the item veto a desirable
check on other legislative bodies By act of congress the Governor
:1 Harold Laski
_
2 Art I, § 7
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of Alaska "may veto any specific item or items"1 in any appropriation
bill So may the Governor of Hawaii 4 , the Governor General of the
Philippines' 5 and the Governor General of Porto Rico ", The Congress
trusts these governors with this salutary power, but not the President
Rather recently at least one state'7 has streamlined the item veto by
a specific authorization to the governor to reduce or veto any item As
stated by the Supreme Court of California:' 8
"Under the old system the governor could eliminate, but
could not reduce an appropriation He may now reduce or
eliminate any one or more items of appropriation money,
while approving other portions of the bill"
"Under the new plan he is not forced to choose between veto-
ing an item of appropriation for a meritorious purpose, or ap-
proving it in an excessive amount Without entirely rejecting
it, he may reduce the amount"
Theoretically, an amendment to the Constitution is unnecessary-the
President could veto or reduce items if Congress would insert in each
appropriation bill a clause (or pass a general act) to that effect But
what Congress gives Congress may take away What the country needs
is the constitutional right of the President to reduce or disapprove any
item or items
The amendment might read something like this:
"The President shall have power to disapprove or reduce
any item or parts of items in any bill appropriating money in
the same manner and subject to the same limitations as he
may, under Section 7 of Article I of the Constitution, dis-
approve as a whole any bill which shall have been presented
to him
"So much of such a bill as he approves shall upon his signing
the same become law"
With this should be an amendment forbidding riders to bills which
have no connection with the title or the aim of the bill
Some forty states already have the item veto James Bryce said "the
change (to item veto) seems a small one" and favored it greatly So do
most observers of the problem Seemingly all that stands in the way is
a certain congressional inertia 18
CHE8KS AND BALANCES VS THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM
The constitutional structure of our government has been changed but
little in 155 years Organizationally speaking, there have been three
revisions The 12th Amendment changed the manner of choosing the
'48U S C A § 86
"48 U S C A § 581
1548 U. S C A § 1052
16 48 U $. C A. § 825.
27 CALrF CoNsT Art IV, §§ 16 and 34
18 Wood v Riley, 192 Cal 293, 219 Pac 966, 969 (1923)
ington, Art 3, § 12) do not limit the item veto to appropriations And that
is as it should be But limiting item veto to appropriations may facilitate
passage of an amendment to the Federal Constitution
1946]
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President The 17th provides for the popular election of senators The
20th changes inauguration day from March to January
No dynamic people made so few organic changes in governmental
structure during the 19th and this first half of the 20th century Yet
looking at ourselves as others see us it is interesting to note that none
of the several self-governing nations which emerged after World War I
fashioned its constitution after that of the United States in respect to
basic relationships between the legislature and the chief executive These
nations owed their emancipation to us; they revered Woodrow Wilson
We were at a zenith of power But none copied our system of checks
and balances 20
Despite their recent emergence from tyranny, these nations preferred
the possible greater efficiency and smoothness of a parliamentary sys-
tem-even at the risk of unbridled power in government For (following
the language of Mr Justice Brandeis) it must be remembered that our
plan of government was adopted not to promote efficiency, but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power
Others have pointed out that our government is cast in rigid chrono-
logical molds With the passing of the seasons when the moon has
waxed and waned forty-eight times, we must elect a new chief executive
-no matter how inopportune the time And until four full years have
passed, we cannot force an election no matter how ineffective the
President may be It is said that except in South America no constitu-
tional arrangement so lacking in flexibility is now to be found anywhere
in the world 21
To this point Henry Hazlitt of the New York Times says:
"If the President and Congress disagree, there is a deadlock
Neither can appeal from the verdict of the other to that of the
country Congress cannot force the resignation of the Presi-
dent, as the British Parliament can that of the Prime Minister,
by voting a lack of confidence The President, on his side,
cannot force Congress to adopt a policy that he considers vital
by dissolving Congress and appealing from its verdict to that
of the country Congress can prevent the President from doing
as he wishes but cannot make him do what it wishes Respon-
sibility is divided and lost even within the Congress itself
The Senate can block the overwhelming will of the House,
though that will may reflect an equal sentiment in the
country 22
Writing some 75 years ago, Walter Bagehot said:
"The American government calls itself a government of the
supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a
sovereign power is most needed, you cannot find the supreme
people You have got a Congress elected for one fixed period,
going out perhaps by fixed installments, which cannot be
"Frank I Cobb, Is Our Democracy Stagnaunt?, HARPERS MAGAZINE (June,
1923).1 WILLIAm MACDONALD, A NEW CoNsTTUTIoN FOR A NEW AMERICA (1921)22 A NEW CoNsTrriuoN Now, Whittlesey House (1942) 4
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accelerated or retarded-you have a President chosen for a
fixed period, and immovable during that period; all the ar-
rangements are for stated times There is no elastic element,
everything is rigid, specified, dated Come what may, you can
quicken nothing and can retard nothing You have bespoken
your government in advance, and whether it works well or
works ill, whether it is what you want or not, by law you must
keep it ,,23
It is argued that no corporation would tolerate a president who is
unable to work in harmony with its board of directors The conflicts
and delays would be written in red ink But when it comes to govern-
ment, it is said that while delay is the enemy of efficiency it is the friend
of stability And so, in the interest of stability and, we hope, liberty, the
country has endured deadlocks between the Congress and the executive
such as the deadlock on fundamental questions of foreign policy during
1919, 1920 and 1921 and upon economic questions during the last half
of the Hoover administration
Numerous proposals are in the air Some forthright people boldly
advocate a full shift to the parliamentary or cabinet system, such as
prevails in Great Britain Such proposals usually contemplate the
perpetuation of the office of president He would dedicate hospitals,
review troops, and generally do what the titular head of a state is
supposed to do Real executive power would be lodged in a first min-
ister and cabinet, chosen as is the British cabinet, and similarly subject
to change
Other observers advocate modifications designed to give some of the
benefits of the parliamentary system without abandoning our traditional
organization For instance, it has been advocated that the President be
selected by the newly elected House and Senate, in joint session
assembled, for a term certain, presumably the present term of four
years This proposal is a gesture in the direction of the parliamentary
system But it is not much more because the very essence of the
parliamentary system is that the chief executive (often called the prime
minister) resigns after a vote howing lack of legislative confidence
in him
In his book called "Can Representative Government Do the Job?" 21
Thomas K Finletter advocates a joint Executive-Legislative cabinet
coupled with a constitutional amendment giving the President the right
to dissolve Congress and call a general election whenever a deadlock
arises But the President would not be required to go to the people
merely because he is disappointed with certain legislation Inherent in
this proposal is the requirement that the terms of the President, the
Senators and the members of the House of Representatives should be
the same Mr Finletter thinks six years preferable to four
'2 Id. p 272 4 Reynal & Hitchcock (1945)
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'I he expression "Joint Executive-Legislative Cabinet" is not a familiar
one It goes much further than, for instance, the Kefauver resolution
which calls for an amendment of the House rules so as to provide
for the regular appearance of cabinet members and agency heads on
the floor of the House to answer questions It is different from the
suggestion that the Constitution should be amended to make every
cabinet member ex-officio a member of the House or Senate, with full
privileges of the floor, but no vote
A joint Executive-Legislative Cabinet means a cabinet representing
the two branches-Executive and Legislative-so that Congress would
(the proponents hope) actually collaborate with the Executive in the
making of overall policies Something like a joint cabinet on foreign
affairs is aleady found in the joint committee representing the State
Depaitment, the Foreign Relations Committee of the House and the
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate
The proposal is that this joint Executive-Legislative Cabinet be
composed of nine congressional leaders (chosen as the House and Senate
may determine) and the nine members of the President's cabinet
Subject to congressional approval, this cabinet would determine the
grand pattern of legislative and executive policy Important recommen-
dations concerning legislation would not be handed the Congress as if
by executive mandate, as now is often the case Recommendations
would come from the joint Executive-Legislative Cabinet just as under
the parliamentary system administration bills ate proposed by the
cabinet
With a somewhat different approach, Henry Hazlitt 25 believes the
minimum changes necessary to the attainment of the minimum flex-
ibility essential to the preservation of our government to be:
(a) The selection of executive leadership by the legislative
branch, with responsibility to the legislative branch The
elimination of the veto power would be a corollary of this
(b) The extension of the normal term of members of the
House of Representatives to, say, four years, with no constitu-
tional assurance of such a term The chosen leader of the legis-
lative branch would have the power to dissolve that branch
whenever an impasse is such that he believes that an election
should be held
(c) The reduction of the Senate to a position comparable with
the House of Lords Mr Hazlitt says: "As long as the two
houses of Congress have equal powers, any cabinet formed
must have the constant support of both houses " Because of
the radically different method of selection, the House and
Senate may be, and often are, at odds
The plans just sketched are examples of the kinds of constitutional
surgery which, it is said, will be required if the present system of
periodic and prolonged conflict between the legislative and the executive
2 A NEw CONSTITUTION Now, 103 et seq
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branches is to be avoided There are other proposals with the same end
in view, and all are subject to many variations 26
No space was given to the internal reorganization of the President's
cabinet and the sprawling executive departments are here ignored Those
are legislative, not constitutional matters This joint Executive-Legis-
lative Cabinet, too, could be created by legislation and requires no
amendment It is here considered as an incident of the proposal that
the President be given the power to dissolve the Congress if and when
he finds the executive and the legislative branches at cross purposes
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
Brief mention of presidential succession seems appropriate Presidents
elected at 20-year intervals die in office:
1840-William Henry Harrison succeeded by John Tyler
1860-Abraham Lincoln succeeded by Andrew Johnson
1880-James A Garfield succeeded by Chester Arthur
1900--William McKinley succeeded by Theodore Roosevelt
1920-Warren G Harding succeeded by Calvin Coolidge
1940-Franklin D Roosevelt succeeded by Harry Truman
A common proposal is that the office of vice-president be abolished
and that the president be succeeded by the speaker of the House to
serve until an election be held within, say, six months
TiE JUDICIA DEPARTMENT
Perhaps the majority of current proposals for the improvement of
the federal judicial system have to do with judicial review of the
decisions of administrative agencies These proposals are of paramount
importance But their nature is legislative rather than constitutional
Hence we pass Article III of the Federal Constitution 2-
Sections 3 and 5 of Article IV of our state constitution provide for
the election of supreme and superior court judges In practice, most
judges are first appointed by the governor and are then elected and
re-elected until the Grim Reaper takes them from the bench and a
successor is appointed
We do not grant the judges the security of tenure of life appointment
which enables a mediocre man to forget things of the world and-
secure in his position-dedicate all his energies to being the best judge
possible Nor do we put inferior judges out Experience shows it to be
almost impossible to defeat an incumbent judge, no matter how incom-
petent he is
There are several possible modifications of the appointive system
designed to give the electorate some control, yet take the judges out of
-6 See Wn LmA. YANDErL ELIOT, Professor of Government, Harvard Uni-
versity, THE NEED FOR CoNsTUrToNAL REFORM (1925), and ALEXANDER HEH-
wMEy, TnuE FOR CHANGE
27 This by-passing proposals which would do away with judicial review
of legislative and executive acts See, for instance, discussion of Judicial
Review and the Power to Govern, WILLIAM H HEssLER, OuR INEFFEcTIVE
STATE, Henry Holt & Co (1937) c 7
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politics and remove economic hazards This problem has been studied
and reports made by bar association committees But it has never been
the subject of inquiry by the Judicial Council of the State of Washing-
ton An official study with recommendations from that authoritative
body might prove constructive
TnE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS
Article IV of the United States Constitution has to do with the rela-
tionship between the Federal and State governments 28
Federal impingements upon the former autonomy of states usually
have been justified under the commerce clause or the general welfare
clause, both appearing elsewhere in the Constitution The activities of
the federal government have been enlarged by legislation They may be
constrained by legislation Hence, it may be correct to say that federal
invasion of states rights has become an economic, legislative and political
problem-constitutional barriers having been largely eliminated by
construction of the Constitution No important proposed amendment to
Article IV has been found
PROVISIONS FOR AMENDING
Under Article V of the Federal Constitution amendments are sub-
mitted to the states for ratification "whenever two-thirds of both houses
shall deem it necessary 1129 Or an amendment may be submitted by a
convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments "on the
application of the Legislatures of two-thirds" of the states This method
has never been used Several thousand proposals for amendments have
been submitted to the Congress But only twenty-six have been ap-
proved by the Congress for submission to the states and of these only
twenty-one have been ratified
Quoting Jefferson as saying that "the earth belongs always to the
living generation" some observers urge that there would be less legisla-
tive and judicial evasion of the Constitution were it easier to amend 3o
Others assert that if the Constitution were easy to amend the "habit
of amendment would turn into the habit of tinkering " A sense of con-
stitutional security would be impossible
The difficulty of amendment is advanced as a reason for "inter-
preting" the Constitution to mean something it had never been thought
28 It contains the full faith and credit clause It says that the citizens of
each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in other states It guarantees to every state a republican form of govern-
ment In it. the United States guarantees to protect all states against
invasion and (when requested to do so) against domestic violence
29 The United States Supreme Court holds the two-thirds to be two-
thirds of a quorum
10 James Madison remarked in THE FEDERALIST (No 43) "That useful
alterations will be suggested by experience could not but be foreseen"
He said that although he wished to guard against "that extreme facility
which would render the Constitution too mutable," he thought it would
be well to guard also against 'that extreme difficulty which might per-
petuate its discovered faults'
[VOL 21
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to mean Backers of the court packing plan said in justification that 13
states containing 57o of the voting population can block an amendment
although 35 states with nearly 95 per cent of the population are in
favor of it
Advocates of easier methods of amendment variously propose:
(a) That a majority of the elected membership of both houses may
submit a proposed amendment to the states This has been called a
"psychological change" because two-thirds of a quorum may be less
than half of all But the change would prevent blocking by a minority
(b) That an amendment shall be submitted if approved by two-thirds
of either house for two or three consecutive sessions
(c) That an amendment be submitted upon the request of half the
state legislatures
(d) That ratification be by two-thirds of the states containing two-
thirds of the voting population or that a proposed amendment be
submitted to a direct vote of the people and adopted if approved by a
majority of the voters in a majority of the states
And there are advocates of a mandatory constitutional convention to
be held, say, every thirty years
THE STATE CONSTITUTION
The dilemma in respect to the state judiciary was touched (quite out
of order) under Article III of the Federal Constitution We now turn to
proposals in respect to other articles of the Constitution of the State of
Washington
There are proponents of a unicameral state legislature whose theory
may be epitomized as follows:
There should be a unicameral legislature of from 40 to 50
members (receiving a per diem of perhaps $25 when occupied
with legislative duties) with regular annual sessions of from
90 to 120 days Between sessions there should be a continuing
committee of legislators to represent the legislative branch
and to prepare groundwork for important legislation to be
considered during the next legislative session
Disciples of a unicameral system say that the woeful weakness of the
American system is in the legislative branch They point out that the
governor of Washington is in a much stronger position, relative to the
Washington legislature, than is the President of the United States in
relation to the Congress The remedy, they say, does not lie in lessening
the efficiency of the state executive but in encouraging the legislative
branch to attain a higher degree of efficiency
In Washington the voters must elect eight state executives 31 The
average elector may find it somewhat difficult to discern between the
3'Art HI, § 1, of our State Constitution provides that: "The execu-
tive department shall consist of a governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary
of state, treasurer, auditor, attorney general, superintendent of public in-
struction, and a commissioner of public lands "
1946)
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merits and demerits of sixteen candidates in the November election
and between more in the primary A shorter ballot might result in better
state government
Advocates of the shorter ballot concede that the auditor should be
free from gubernatorial influence but suggest that this can be attained
either by having him elected by the legislative branch or appointed by
the governor with legislative confirmation to serve for a term consider-
ably longer than that of the governor
The direct primary is another much criticized institution of our state
government Some observers say that it is responsible for a progressive
degeneration in the quality of state officials Some would abolish it
completely and return to the convention system Others see value in
the direct primary and would supplement it with provisions for official
party recommendation so that, through its convention, the party is
actually sponsoring a candidate Anyone so inclined would still be able
to file in the primary irrespective of party sponsorship Suggestions of
this sort are sometimes coupled with the thought that the primary should
no longer be indiscriminate A voter should not be able to vote in both
primaries at the same election
The state constitution contains limitations in respect to the salaries
which may be paid certain officials It has been urged that these limi-
tations are archaic and that the pressure to evade them has led to con-
stitutional immorality on the part of the legislature and the courts
SUNDRY PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
It has seemed convenient to close with a quick inventory of sundry
proposed amendments, rather than to fit them into their proper places
in the articles already discussed
(a) There are plans to divide the nation into economic regions or
commonwealths such as the New England region, the Rocky Mountain
region and the South Atlantic region 32 In deference to tradition, his-
torical state lines would be retained for local administrative purposes
But repiesentation in the Congress would be regional
(b) To many, the electrol college seems just so much mumbo-jumbo
and should be abolished If so, the country would have to face the fact
that a president might be elected by a plurality instead of a majority,
or provide a mechanism for deciding between the highest two candidates
in case neither of them had an absolute majority
(c) Reference has been made to the rigidity of our election procedure
in respect to the calendar It may be that some future November in a
year divisible by four will come at a time when it is almost impossible
to hold an election We are no longer free from the threat of physical
invasion by means of rockets and other devices It has been proposed
that Congress should be given the power to postpone an election by
3- See, for example States or Regions, TnTE FOR A CHANGE, C 11
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two-thirds vote with the limitation, for instance, that the election can
be postponed only once and not for a period exceeding, say, six months
(d) Two proposals to limit the franchise must be noticed One is
that voting privileges should be taken from office holders and pension-
ers Proponents argue that these blocs exercise a disproportionate
influence, look strictly to their own purses rather than the public welfare
and make vote getting and lobbying their major occupations
Aside from the merits, opponents point to difficulties in definition
and administration Is a teacher an "office holder" and a disabled vet-
eran a "pensioner"? If others economically dependent upon govern-
ment should be disfranchised, what about a business man holding gov-
ernment contracts?
The second proposal follows John Stuart Mill38 to the effect that
" the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local, should
be elected exclusively by those who pay something toward the taxes
imposed Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other
people's money, have every motive to be lavish and none to be eco-
nomical" Proponents say that neither excise taxes nor sales taxes
are sufficiently felt to make a voter budget-conscious The voter, they
say, should pay a property or income tax or meet specified educational
requirements
(e) Our state elections come in presidential years Often they
seem of secondary importance If we voted for a governor in the even
numbered years not divisible by four, the race for the governorship
would be the top race on the ticket Candidates for the governorship
might be considered more on their own merits and less because of alle-
giance to the then prevailing national ticket
Obviously not all constitutional problems have been touched upon
A most glaring omission pertains to taxation Though much improve-
ment could be made by legislation, some constitutional unscrambling
of the muddle of sales, excise, income, inheritance and property taxes
may be desirable But that is a subject in itself with not a few books
devoted to it "
It is not unfitting to close with the familiar words from Gladstone:
"As the British Constitution is the most subtle organism which
has proceeded from the womb and long gestation of progressive
history, so the American Constitution is, so far as I can see,
the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the
brain and purpose of man "
So if there are here assembled a host of possible amendments to the
Federal Constitution it is not with the thought that the 1787 model is
worn out and should be discarded in favor of a new 1946 model This
33 REPREsETAT=n GovERNmN (Everyman's Edition) 281-282
'Among them, A TAx PROGRAM FOR A SOLvENT AM ECA, by Roswell
Kent, former Undersecretary of the Treasury, as spokesman for the Com-
mittee on Post War Tax Policy
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writer has full confidence that the 1787 product is far better than any
which would be written today It has worked pretty well Nevertheless
we should not be blind to the possibilities of improvement 31 Some of
the proposals referred to in this article were advanced more than three-
quarters of a century ago by John Stuart Mill and by Walter Bagehot,
said to be the most penetrating analyst of government that the English
speaking world has known 36 Their comments have been echoed and
confirmed in times of repose as well as during times of peril by manN
coolheaded and conservative students of our institutions, both foreign
and American
3rFor general discussions, see WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL Gov-
ERNmENT, and CARL BRENT FISmER, Stran Professor of Political Science, Johns
Hopkins University, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVmLOPmENT, Houghton
Mifflin (1943), particularly c 39, The Consttution Today and Tomorrow
36 From A NEw CONSTITUTION Now, supra p 15
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